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ARGUMENT
I. Mr. Anderson’s Appeal Should Not Be Dismissed Based on Timeliness.
A. Introduction
Mr. Anderson was sentenced on August 11, 2016. (R., p. 104). The District
Court issued its initial Judgment of Conviction on August 12, 2016. (R., pp. 108-09).
The Court denied the Defendant’s I.C.R. 35 Motion by Order filed October 12, 2016.
(R., p. 132). The Court subsequently issued a second Judgment on March 8, 2017. (R.,
pp. 137-38). The Court issued its final Judgment on March 10, 2017. (R., pp. 140-42).
Mr. Anderson, while appearing pro se, filed his Notice of Appeal dated April 14,
2017. (R., p. 143). The court clerk filed the Notice on April 19, 2017. (Id.). Mr.
Anderson’s appeal notice was dated 35 days, and filed 40 days, after the issuance of the
final Judgment.
The State argued in its “Respondent’s Brief” that Mr. Anderson failed to file his
Notice of Appeal in a timely manner.

B.

Discussion
Idaho Code §19-2801 starts the discussion by directing that appeals may taken

“from such judgments and orders of the district court, and within such times … as
prescribed by rule of the supreme court.” (Idaho Code §19-2801).
The Idaho Supreme Court established rules for filing of appeals in the Idaho
Appellate Rules. Rule 4 notes that “[a]ny party aggrieved by an appealable judgment,
order or decree, as defined in these rules, … may appeal such decision to the Supreme
Court as provided in these rules.” (Idaho Appellate Rule 4).
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Appellate Rule 11 sets forth the definition of “appealable” judgments and orders
in criminal case proceedings. (See Idaho Appellate Rule 11(c)). The rule states that:
An appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court from the
following judgments and orders …:
(c) Criminal Proceedings. From the following judgments and orders of the
district court in a criminal action, …
(1) Final judgments of conviction.
***
(4) Any order or judgment, whenever entered and however denominated,
terminating a criminal action … . (emphasis added).
***
(6) Any judgment imposing sentence after conviction … .
***
(9) Any order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the
defendant or the state. (emphasis added).
Mr. Anderson’s appeal is notable because it qualifies under all four of the listed
provisions. His Amended Judgment was a final judgment of conviction, it terminated a
criminal action (regardless of when it was entered and how it was denominated), it was a
judgment imposing sentence after conviction, and it affected his substantial rights by
addressing and detailing the term of his sentence and incarceration which the Court
deemed already satisfied.
The Idaho Supreme Court previously discussed the issue of final judgments,
including the matter of the document title in question. In Idah-Best, Inc. v. First Security
Bank of Idaho, 99 Idaho 517, 584 P.2d 1242 (1978), the Court held that “if the instrument
ends the suit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and represents a final
determination of the rights of the parties, the instrument constitutes a final judgment
regardless of its title”.

Id., 99 Idaho at 519 (internal quotations and case citations

omitted). The Court’s ruling makes clear that the final document determining the rights
of the parties is the “final judgment” regardless of the form or title of the document.
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In Mr. Anderson’s case, his “rights” were still being defined past the initial
judgment, to the amended judgments. Certainly, the amount of time a criminal defendant
will serve in prison, and how much time he should receive advanced credit for, is within
the purview of “rights” afforded him. Since the Government is holding Mr. Anderson
against his will and pursuant to law, he is entitled to due process including notice of the
penalties imposed against him. His rights are clearly affected by this determination. As
set forth by the Supreme Court in Idah-Best, the Amended Judgment “ended the suit”,
“adjudicated the subject matter of the controversy”, and represented a “final
determination of the rights of the parties”. See 99 Idaho at 519. The determination of
Mr. Anderson’s rights continued through the process of amending the judgment.
Therefore, the Amended Judgment constituted a “final judgment” for purposes of appeal.
See id. Mr. Anderson’s Notice of Appeal filed within the 42-day time limit from that
Amended Judgment was timely. (See Idaho Appellate Rule 14).
The Government cited two cases in support of its argument for dismissal, State v.
Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 246 P.3d 958 (2010) and State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 866, 920
P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1996). Both are distinguishable from the situation at bar, and are not
dispositive of Mr. Anderson’s appeal.
In Ciccone, a clerical error was at issue. 150 Idaho at 306. This did not affect the
defendant in any way, nor did it affect the substantial rights of either party. (See Idaho
Appellate Rule 11 (c)(9)). The district court, via the court clerk, erroneously dated the
judgment with a hand-written notation. The district court fixed the date by entering an
amended judgment, rather than an order of the court. The defendant appealed from the
amended judgment. The Supreme Court reviewed the rules regarding clerical mistakes in
judgments, and ruled that the such mistakes may be corrected at any time, after providing
6

notice, as the Court orders. (citing Idaho Criminal Rule 36). The Court held that it did
not have “jurisdiction to hear Ciccone’s appeal … based on the degree of accuracy
required of the filing stamp.” 150 Idaho at 306.
This set of facts, and the Supreme Court’s focus on whether the filing stamp
inaccuracy trumped the actual filing date, clearly distinguishes the case from Mr.
Anderson’s situation. In Ciccone, no substantial rights were affected by the amended
judgment. In this case, Mr. Anderson’s sentence and freedom were specifically affected.
Ciccone is not controlling and is clearly distinguishable.
The Payan case is also distinguishable, albeit for entirely different reasons. In
Payan, the defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal initially. 128 Idaho at 867. The
district court later issued an amended judgment. The defendant then failed to file a
subsequent notice of appeal. Instead, the defendant argued that his notice should be
retroactively applied, and therefore was actually premature rather than untimely. Id.
Mr. Anderson is making no such argument. Mr. Anderson appealed directly from
his Amended Judgment, which affected his substantial rights. (See Idaho Appellate Rule
11(c)(9)). He did not fail to file a subsequent appeal after an initial untimely filing, as in
Payan. He did not file an appeal notice and then argue it was premature based on a
future court event, as in Payan. Finally, he did not request retroactive application of his
appeal notice, as in Payan. Based thereon, Mr. Anderson asserts that Payan is not
controlling and is clearly distinguishable.

The appellate case of State v. Hancock, 111 Idaho 835, 727 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App.
1986), provides valuable direction to the Court in cases where a defendant’s substantial
rights are affected by a final amended judgment, such as in Mr. Anderson’s case. In
7

Hancock, the district court entered an unusual judgment which apparently failed to spell
out the exact terms of the defendant’s probation. Mr. Hancock was charged with a
subsequent crime, and the State filed a probation violation against Mr. Hancock based on
the new charges. In a separate proceeding under the original case, the district court
issued an amended judgment, in which it detailed the length of the probationary term.
Hancock argued that he was not provided proper notice of the probationary term, and
therefore could not be held in violation even though he had subsequently violated a state
law. The district court found this argument completely without merit, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.
However, in the course of the appeal regarding the probation issue, Hancock also
argued that his original sentence was excessive. The Court held that the appeal was
untimely. In doing so, the Court declared that the amended judgment, which set forth the
terms of probation, “was a final judgment of conviction and was appealable under Idaho
Appellate Rule 11(c)(1) and (6).” Id. at 839 (emphasis added)
This case is important for the simple declaration set forth above. In Hancock, the
Court found that an amended judgment which affected the defendant was a “final
judgment” and was a “judgment imposing sentence after conviction”. Both of these types
of judgments constitute appealable judgments, according to Idaho appellate rules.
Appellate Rule 11(c)(1) allows appeals of “final” judgments, while Rule 11(c)(6) allows
appeals of judgments imposing sentence after conviction.
The Hancock Court’s ruling should be applied to Mr. Anderson’s case. Mr.
Anderson’s Amended Judgment was the “final Judgment” in a series of judgments issued
by the district court. Therefore, it should qualify as an appealable order, as in Hancock.
Mr. Anderson’s Amended Judgment was a “judgment imposing sentence” (and clarifying
8

that sentence) “after conviction”. Therefore, it should qualify as an appealable order, as
in Hancock.
Finally, as discussed above, Mr. Anderson’s Amended Judgment “affected the
substantial rights of the defendant.” (See Idaho Appellate Rule 11(c)(9). As discussed
above, the amendment unequivocally affected the terms of his imprisonment, a “seizure”
by the government under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Under the plain language of the Court rule, the “order affecting the substantial rights” of
Mr. Anderson was appealable.
Based thereon, dismissal is not in order. The Court should reject this argument,
and decide Mr. Anderson’s appeal on the merits of the case.

II. The State Failed to Raise Arguments Against the Merits of Mr. Anderson’s
Appeal, and Therefore Has Waived Any Such Arguments.
The State’s brief included the sole issue of “timeliness”. The State failed to raise
any arguments concerning the merits of Mr. Anderson’s appeal.
In choosing to do so, the State chose to waive any and all such arguments. Issues
on appeal that are not supported by propositions of law or authority are deemed waived
and will not be considered by the Supreme Court. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117
P.3d 120, 122 (2005). The Supreme Court explained its rationale, indicating that the
reason it will not consider issues not addressed in the opening brief[s] is that “the issues
presented … are the arguments and authority to which the [opposing party] has an
opportunity to respond.” Id.; see also State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d
596, 601 (1993)(stating that “raising the issue at this late stage of the briefing does not
allow for full consideration of the issue, and we will not address it”). Mr. Anderson
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would be substantially prejudiced by allowing the government to proceed with arguments
it did not offer or submit in its Reply Brief.

In his Opening Brief, Mr. Anderson discussed in detail numerous mitigating
factors present is his case, all of which indicated that a more lenient determinate sentence
would have been appropriate. Those included the fact that Mr. Anderson accepted
responsibility for his conduct and expressed remorse for his actions, had no prior violent
felony record or record of similar charges, his more-culpable co-defendant was sentenced
to a lesser sentence (ten years determinate and fifteen years indeterminate), thereby
creating unnecessary and unwarranted sentencing disparities, he had severe substance
abuse issues, and he suffered from significant mental health issues. (See Appellant’s
Opening Brief, pp. 10-23).
The District Court’s insufficient consideration of all the mitigating factors, and
therefore, its insufficient consideration of Idaho’s recognized sentencing objectives,
caused it to impose an excessive determinate sentence in an abuse of its discretion.
Anderson then urged this Court to address and remedy that abuse.
The State offered no objection or reply to these arguments on appeal. Since the
State failed to object to any of these arguments, which Mr. Anderson presented in detail
in his Opening Brief, they have waived those arguments. The Court should accept Mr.
Anderson’s arguments without opposition from the government.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above and foregoing, Mr. Anderson’s appeal should proceed with
this Court.
10

Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court reduce the fixed or determinate
portion of his sentence as it deems appropriate and just, based on his personal
characteristics and under the circumstances of the case.
In the alternative, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that the Court vacate his
sentence, and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing after the district court
conducts a comprehensive evaluation of Mr. Anderson’s mental health condition, in
accordance with applicable Idaho law, including Idaho Code §19-2522 and Idaho
Criminal Rule 32.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of February, 2018.

_/s/ Paul E. Riggins____________
PAUL E. RIGGINS
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of February, 2018, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document, by emailing an electronic copy to:

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Lori A. Fleming
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise ID 83720-0010

Via email: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

__/s/ Paul E. Riggins_________________
Paul E. Riggins
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